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The use of active interrogation to induce delayed neutron emission is a well-established tech-
nique for the characterization of special nuclear materials (SNM). Delayed neutrons have isotope-
characteristic spectral and temporal signatures, which provide the basis for isotope identification.
However, in bulk materials that contain an appreciable fissile (e.g., 235U or 233U) fraction, such as
highly-enriched uranium (HEU), delayed neutrons have a high probability of inducing additional
fissions. As a result, the overall delayed neutron signature consists of two distinct components: the
“primary” delayed neutrons (emitted directly by fission fragments), and the “secondary prompt”
fission neutrons produced in fission induced by primary delayed neutrons. These prompt products
differ from “primary” delayed neutrons both in their energy spectra and in the presence of coincident
radiation released by the parent fission event. The presence and relative quantity of prompt prod-
ucts from delayed fission depend on the cross-section of the material in the energy range of delayed
neutrons, which may differ significantly between isotopes, thus providing an exploitable means for
isotope differentiation. In this work, we demonstrate two experimental approaches for discriminat-
ing between 235U and 238U isotopes based on the measurement of delayed neutron-induced fission
products. First, HEU and depleted uranium objects are differentiated through the detection of high-
energy prompt neutrons from delayed fission using both recoil-based organic liquid scintillators and
thermalization spectra from a custom-built capture-gated composite detector. Secondly, coincident
radiation measurements are used as the basis for discrimination by comparing the overall rates and
time evolution of fission events when delayed neutrons are present.
I. INTRODUCTION
Measurement methods that can provide detailed infor-
mation on the composition of special nuclear materials
(SNM) are integral to many nuclear security and non-
proliferation applications. In particular, determination
of the relative isotopic abundance of 235U and 238U plays
a central role in international safeguards inspections, the
production and accounting of nuclear fuel, and verifi-
cation of proper storage and dismantlement of weapons
components under disarmament treaties [1–3]. Active in-
terrogation sources use external radiation to induce nu-
clear reactions in a target material, and are commonly
employed to characterize the content of SNM by inducing
fission to augment both the prompt and delayed neutron
and gamma-ray signatures emitted by the material [4].
When SNM is interrogated using a pulsed neutron
source, the induced fission signature persists even after
the source is turned off. Source neutrons become ther-
malized in the surrounding material, and their popula-
tion decays with a characteristic time on the order of a
few microseconds [5]. When SNM is present, these ther-
malized neutrons can induce additional fission events,
providing a secondary source of neutrons, which causes
the overall population of thermalized neutrons to decay
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more slowly. Measurements of the neutron dieaway can
thus provide an indication of the presence of fissile mate-
rial, and are a well-established means for detecting and
characterizing SNM [6, 7]. Unlike the common dieaway
technique, this work focuses on another persistent sig-
nal: the emission and subsequent interaction of delayed
neutrons in the interrogated material. By recording the
sample response over a much longer timescale (tens of
seconds), we show that it is also possible to deduce ad-
ditional signatures from 235U and 238U and gain insight
into the isotopic content of the sample.
The emission of delayed neutrons by fission fragments
is a well-known phenomenon [8–10], and the measure-
ment of delayed neutron signatures has long been estab-
lished as an effective method for detecting fissionable ma-
terials [11]. Fission reactions generate a variety of unsta-
ble nuclei, which are typically neutron-rich and undergo β
decay. A fraction of the decaying nuclei also release their
energy through neutron emission. The delay between the
initial fission event and these secondary emitted neutrons
depends on the chain decay kinetics, which are character-
istic of the fission fragments, and ranges from a few hun-
dreds of nanoseconds to tens of seconds. The β-delayed
neutrons are commonly divided into a set of groups based
primarily on similarities in their precursor half-lives [12].
The specific parameters for the groups depend on the iso-
tope undergoing fission, as well as the type and energy
of the fission-inducing particle. Despite the fact that de-
layed neutrons account for only a small fraction of the
overall fission neutron yield, detection systems that uti-
lize active interrogation to intensify the emitted delayed
neutron signal have been successfully used to detect and
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2identify fissionable materials [13–18].
Because the delayed neutron groups for a particular
fissionable isotope have a unique set of individual decay
constants, each isotope possesses a characteristic aggre-
gate temporal profile for delayed neutron emission, which
can be used as the basis for identification. Previous stud-
ies have applied this principle to differentiate SNM sam-
ples by measuring the decay of the delayed neutron rate
for short-lived [19] and long-lived groups [20–22]. In our
own prior work, we have utilized both the buildup and de-
cay time profiles of long-lived delayed neutron groups to
perform isotopic discrimination and infer the enrichment
level of uranium [23]. While the energy and timing char-
acteristics of delayed neutrons have been determined by
dedicated precision measurements, the observed delayed
neutron signature for bulk materials can be complicated
by additional interactions before the delayed neutrons es-
cape the object. In the case of fissile materials such as
235U and 239Pu, delayed neutrons with an average energy
of 250–450 keV can readily induce numerous additional
fission events. This delayed neutron-induced fission is a
basic concept in nuclear reactor kinetics, where it rep-
resents an important consideration in maintaining the
desired state of criticality in a reactor. In the context of
neutron energy spectrum, however, it leads to an overall
delayed signal that is a superposition of two components:
“primary” delayed neutrons, which are emitted directly
from the decay of fission fragments, and the prompt fis-
sion neutrons, where the fission is induced by delayed
neutrons. In fact, in order to measure the delayed neu-
tron energy spectra with a high degree of accuracy, sam-
ple sizes have been restricted to small amounts (<10 g) of
material with the express purpose of limiting distortions
caused by fission multiplication [12, 24, 25].
Because the prompt fission products of the delayed
neutron-induced fission events are emitted nearly instan-
taneously, they mimic the time distribution of the de-
layed neutrons, and do not significantly alter the mea-
sured neutron temporal profile (notwithstanding the po-
tential differences in detector efficiency when measuring
the time-evolving neutron spectrum). In contrast, the
overall delayed energy spectrum is significantly changed
by the introduction of prompt fission neutrons, which
typically have much higher energies than delayed neu-
trons. Furthermore, the prompt neutrons from delayed
fission are accompanied by additional coincident neu-
trons and γ rays. The determining factor in the relative
abundance of prompt fission products in the delayed sig-
nal is the average fission cross-section of a particular ma-
terial in the delayed neutron energy range. Because this
cross-section may differ significantly between isotopes, as
is the case for 235U and 238U, the detection of high-energy
prompt neutrons and coincident radiation from fission in
the delayed signature of SNM may provide the basis for
isotopic identification.
In the previous work it has been demonstrated that
proton beam are an effective means for inducing delayed
neutron signatures in SNM targets and can discriminate
fissionable materials at lower dose rates than photon- or
neutron-based sources [26]. The report also proposes that
measurement of delayed neutrons above a certain energy
threshold would indicate the presence of delayed neutron-
induced fission and provide a method for discriminating
uranium isotopes.
Here, we present two experimental methods for dis-
ambiguating the genesis of delayed neutrons as a means
for discriminating 235U and 238U. In the first approach,
which leverages the method proposed in Ref. [26], recoil-
based organic liquid scintillators and a custom-built
capture-gated composite detector are used to perform
spectroscopic measurements of delayed neutrons, and
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is successfully differen-
tiated from depleted uranium (DU) based on the pres-
ence of high-energy prompt neutrons in its delayed sig-
nature. While the measurement of high-energy prompt
neutrons from delayed neutron-induced fission has previ-
ously been proposed as a method for discriminating ura-
nium isotopes, to the best of our knowledge, this work
represents the first time that such energy information has
been specifically targeted and extracted from the overall
delayed signature as a means for isotopic identification.
In the second approach, we demonstrate the first use of
coincidence counting to observe the contribution of de-
layed neutron-induced fission to the overall fission rate
and successfully differentiate HEU from DU on this ba-
sis.
II. MATERIALS & METHODS
Experimental measurements were performed at the
Device Assembly Facility (DAF), Nevada National Se-
curity Site, using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and
depleted uranium (DU) test objects of approximately
13.8 kg and 12.8 kg, respectively. Further details on the
uranium objects are included in the Supplementary Infor-
mation. Each uranium object was interrogated with 14.1-
MeV neutrons produced by a Thermo Scientific P211 DT
neutron generator, with an approximate isotropic yield of
108 n/s. The objects were placed at a distance of 13 cm
from the generator, as measured from the center of the
object to the center of the target plane in the generator
tube. The DT generator was operated at a pulse rate of
100 Hz with a pulse width of approximately 10 μs, which
was consistent across all measurements.
In each measurement, the uranium object was sur-
rounded by an array of detectors, which included one 5.1-
cm diameter NaI(Tl) detector, two 7.6-cm diameter Eljen
EJ309 organic liquid scintillators [27], and one custom-
built heterogeneous composite scintillator. The compos-
ite detector is a larger version of the prototype described
in Ref. [28], and consists of an array of lithium glass
square rods embedded in a cylindrical matrix of scintil-
lating polyvinyl toluene (PVT). The principal detection
mechanism for the composite detector is neutron cap-
ture by 6Li in the glass rods, which possess very different
3scintillation properties from the PVT plastic. As a re-
sult, neutron capture events are easily distinguishable by
both a characteristic pulse shape and the characteristic
Q-value of the reaction. The PVT matrix surrounding
the lithium glass rods serves a dual purpose. Not only
does it increase the capture efficiency of the detector by
moderating the incident neutrons, but the scintillation
response of the PVT to proton recoils in the neutron
thermalization process provides a signal whose magni-
tude is correlated to the incident neutron energy [29]. By
exploiting the time coincidence between a capture pulse
and the preceding proton recoil pulse, spectroscopic neu-
tron energy analysis can be performed [30]. Additional
information on the composite detector design and oper-
ation is provided in the Supplementary Information.
For each measurement, the composite detector was
placed vertically at a distance of 21 cm from the central
axis of the PVT cylinder to the center of the uranium ob-
ject. The NaI(Tl) and EJ309 scintillators were placed at
different locations around the object, each at a distance
of 11 cm from the center of the object to the front face of
the detector. Fig. 1 shows the experimental setup used
for measurement of both uranium objects.
FIG. 1: Experimental setup during measurement of the
HEU object.
Digital pulses were recorded using CAEN desktop
waveform digitizers, and data acquisition and storage was
performed using CAEN Multi-Parameter Spectroscopy
Software (CoMPASS) [31]. For each waveform, short-
gate (Qshort) and long-gate (Qlong) charge integrals were
recorded to provide the basis for pulse shape discrimi-
nation. The integration parameters were optimized for
each detector prior to the experiment to provide the best
degree of discrimination. Further details on the data ac-
quisition equipment and methods are presented in the
Supplementary Information.
The neutron generator was operated in a series of
on/off cycles, during which the induced delayed neutron
signatures of the HEU and DU objects were recorded. In
each cycle, the generator was turned on for one minute,
then off for one minute. Each object was interrogated
over a period of approximately 2.5 hours (∼70 on/off cy-
cles), and the data collected during the generator off time
was aggregated to form the overall delayed signal. Pas-
sive measurements of the HEU and DU objects were also
recorded, for 3 minutes and 10 minutes, respectively. The
detectors were calibrated using 137Cs and AmBe sources.
III. SIMULATION
To estimate the expected contrast in the delayed neu-
tron emission spectra from bulk samples of HEU and DU,
Monte Carlo simulations were conducted. The simula-
tion and the associated method for separating the com-
ponents of the delayed neutron spectrum are detailed in
the Supplementary Information. For HEU, prompt neu-
trons from delayed fission account for about 65% of the
delayed neutron signature, with the remaining 35% con-
tributed by primary delayed neutrons. In contrast, pri-
mary delayed neutrons made up over 98% of the emitted
signal for DU.
In addition to the experimental object materials, sim-
ulations of the expected relative proportion of primary
delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from delayed fis-
sion were performed for a variety of uranium enrichments
to explore the potential for finer determination of the en-
richment level based on the induced neutron spectrum.
Fig. 2 shows the proportion of the overall delayed neu-
tron signal that is expected to be contributed by sec-
ondary prompt neutrons as a function of enrichment. Ta-
ble I shows a summary of the simulated neutron spectrum
breakdown for selected enrichment levels.
FIG. 2: Simulated contribution of secondary prompt
neutrons to the overall delayed neutron signature as a
function of uranium enrichment. The red line is
provided only as a guide to the eye.
While higher-energy prompt neutrons make up only a
small fraction of the delayed neutron spectrum for DU,
4TABLE I: Simulated contribution to overall delayed
neutron spectrum from primary delayed neutrons and
prompt neutrons from delayed fission for selected
uranium enrichments.
Material (Enrichment) Primary Delayed Prompt
DU (0.02%) 98.5% 1.5%
LEU (5%) 86% 14%
LEU (20%) 72% 28%
HEU (93%) 35% 65%
their proportion increases rapidly as enrichment increases
from 0.2% to 20%, and they already form a significant
part of the delayed signal for 5%-enriched LEU. As a re-
sult, it may be possible to distinguish LEU from natural
uranium based on the presence of higher-energy neutrons
in the delayed neutron signature. Furthermore, the rel-
ative contribution from prompt neutrons doubles as en-
richment increases from 5% to 20%, and more than dou-
bles again for weapons-grade enrichment levels (>90%).
Such separation suggests that the proportion of higher-
energy delayed neutrons may serve as an observable for
estimating the enrichment level of uranium-containing
materials.
For each material, the fractional contributions of pri-
mary delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from de-
layed fission were used to approximate the delayed neu-
tron energy spectra, which were then used to simulate
the expected response in the composite detector using
the Geant4 framework [32]. While MCNPX is better
suited for simulating the production of delayed neutrons,
Geant4 does not have the same geometrical limitations,
making it the more convenient choice for modeling the
complex structure of the composite detector. To simulate
the light output response to proton recoils during ther-
malization in the PVT, the detector was bombarded with
neutrons with energies sampled from the delayed [12] and
prompt [33] energy spectra in accordance with their rel-
ative proportion for each isotope. The light output pro-
duced by neutron elastic scatters on protons in the de-
tector was modeled using a similar method to the one
described in Ref. [34], with a polynomial function of the
form
L = aE − b [1− exp(−cE)] , (1)
where L is the light output, E is the energy deposited on
the proton, and a, b, and c are fitting parameters. The
light output contribution from scatters on carbon nuclei
was assumed to be approximately 2% of the energy de-
posited. A Gaussian broadening function was parameter-
ized and applied to the calculated light output according
to the method outlined in Ref. [35]. Fig. 3 shows the
simulated delayed neutron energy spectra for bulk HEU
and DU, as well as the expected light output response
of the composite detector. The light output units are
MeVee (MeV electron equivalent), where 1 MeVee rep-
resents the light output generated by 1 MeV of electron
energy deposition.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 3: (a) Simulated delayed neutron energy spectra
for bulk HEU and DU, based on proportional
contribution of prompt products of delayed fission, and
(b) simulated response of the composite detector to
overall HEU and DU delayed energy spectra. In both
cases, counting results are based on simulation of
250,000 source particles.
The simulated delayed energy spectra and correspond-
ing detector response show very significant differences for
each material based on the presence of delayed fission
events, especially at higher neutron energies. This sug-
gests that 235U and 238U should be readily distinguish-
able based on the presence of high-energy neutrons in the
measured delayed signal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A significant advantage of the composite detector is
that it provides strong discrimination of neutron-capture
events on 6Li, which can then be used to identify poten-
tial preceding thermalization events in the detector and
extract spectroscopic energy information from the inci-
dent neutrons. Fig. 4 shows the pulse-shape parameter
(PSP ) and light output distribution for the AmBe cal-
5ibration measurement in the composite detector, where
the PSP is defined as
PSP = (Qlong −Qshort) /Qlong. (2)
The parameter space located around PSP = 0.55 and
light output of about 0.32 MeVee corresponds to neutron
capture events. A 3-σ cut was established in two dimen-
sions around this region, and any events falling within the
cut were classified as neutron captures in the subsequent
measurements.
FIG. 4: Calibration PSP and light output distribution
in the composite detector when exposed to an AmBe
source. Neutron captures were identified using a 3-σ cut
around the island feature centered at PSP = 0.55 and
light output of 0.32 MeVee.
The delayed neutron energy spectra for HEU and DU
were compared by analyzing the capture-gated light out-
put response in the composite detector. For each neutron
capture event, the previously recorded pulse was exam-
ined to determine if it could have been caused by thermal-
ization of the fast neutron in the PVT prior to capture.
Because the type of PVT used in the composite detector
is not PSD-capable, there is only one recoil region corre-
sponding to both neutron and gamma-ray interactions. A
Gaussian fit to this region established a mean PSP value
of 0.0865, and pulses exhibiting deviation from the mean
greater than 3-σ were rejected. Geant4 simulations were
also used to determine the time scale of neutron ther-
malization in the composite detector. Both prompt and
delayed incident neutron energy spectra were modeled;
the results indicate that 99% of captures occur within
76 μs of the initial scattering interaction in the detec-
tor, and that incident neutron energy has little effect on
the shape of the time distribution of capture-gated re-
coil pulses. As such, only recoil pulses that occur within
76 μs before the subsequent capture event were included
in the capture-gated light output distribution. Fig. 5
shows the resulting capture-gated light output distribu-
tions for HEU and DU.
FIG. 5: Comparison of experimentally measured
capture-gated light output distributions in the
composite detector for HEU and DU. Recoil events with
PSP = 0.0865± 3σ and a recoil-capture coincidence
time < 76 μs were accepted. The count rate for DU
above 400 keVee is consistent with the measured rate of
gamma-ray accidentals within the recoil-capture
acceptance window.
While some increase in the delayed neutron counting
rate is expected for HEU relative to DU due to the greater
mass of the HEU object and increased fission cross sec-
tion for 14.1-MeV neutrons, the higher overall rate is
also consistent with increased multiplication caused by
delayed neutrons. However, the marked increase in high-
light-output events for HEU indicates a significant dif-
ference in the overall energy spectrum, which can be ex-
plained by the presence of higher-energy prompt neutrons
from delayed fission. Such differences in the shape of the
neutron energy spectrum may provide the basis for dis-
crimination between isotopes and inference of the enrich-
ment level. One possible method would involve compar-
ing the relative contribution of high-light-output events
to the overall spectrum using a simple ratio of two inte-
gration regions. A more detailed outline of the proposed
method is provided in the Supplementary Information.
Examination of the time distribution of coincident
recoil-capture pulses can provide additional insight into
the observed light output spectra. While the simulated
light output response for delayed neutrons from 238U is
largely restricted to below 400 keVee, the experimentally
measured distribution extends to higher light outputs.
Since the delayed neutrons do not have enough energy
to produce higher light output pulses in the detector
(and a large fraction cannot even produce a pulse above
a ∼100 keVee detection threshold), this suggests either
that there is a higher rate of delayed fission than pre-
dicted by tabulated nuclear data, or that the capture-
gated light output distribution is dominated by gamma-
ray accidentals from background or passive emission by
the DU object. If accidentals dominate, then the dis-
6tribution I(t) of time differences between two adjacent
pulses is governed by the general expression
I(t) = r exp(−rt), (3)
where t is the time between two pulses, and r is the
rate of accidentals. In the scenario where there are very
few true thermalization events, Eq. (3) predicts that the
time distribution should exhibit a simple exponential de-
cay shape. Fig. 6 shows the experimental recoil-capture
coincidence time distributions for HEU and DU, which
have been fitted with an exponential function represent-
ing the expected contribution of background accidentals.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 6: Experimental recoil-capture coincidence time
distributions in the composite detector for (a) HEU and
(b) DU. Each curve is fitted with an exponential
function representing the expected contribution of
background accidentals. For HEU, the χ2 value applies
only to the range of times beyond 90 μs. For DU, the
χ2 value applies to the full range.
In both cases, the exponential function was fitted to
the time window beyond 90 μs, where the contribution
of true neutron thermalization events is negligible (less
than 1% of the total distribution). The model is then
extended back over the range of possible neutron ther-
malization times. In the case of DU, the exponential
function is consistent with the entire distribution, sug-
gesting that few, if any, of the pulses preceding neutron
capture events are caused by thermalization of delayed
neutrons. In contrast, the time distribution for HEU
departs significantly from a simple exponential shape in
the neutron thermalization window, and the point where
this deviation becomes noticeable is near the maximum
thermalization time of 76 μs predicted by simulation. Af-
ter subtracting the background exponential fit, 98.5% of
capture-gated recoil pulses occur within the 76 μs time
window, in close agreement with the simulated result of
99%. Furthermore, the decay constant of the exponen-
tial fit is very similar for each data set, which suggests a
common cause of accidentals, such as gamma-ray back-
ground. The idea that gamma-ray accidentals dominate
the recoil-capture coincidences for DU above 400 keVee
was validated by examining the overall recoil rates in the
composite detector. Details on this analysis are presented
in the Supplementary Information. The significant dif-
ference in the time-to-capture curves for HEU and DU
suggest that this signal may provide yet another means
for performing isotopic discrimination.
Recoil-based organic liquid scintillators are poorly
suited to detecting lower-energy primary delayed neu-
trons because those neutrons are unlikely to produce a re-
sponse above a detection threshold of ∼100 keVee. How-
ever, higher-energy prompt neutrons from delayed fission
can be easily detected, as they are far more likely to pro-
duce a pulse above the threshold. Fig. 7 shows the PSP
and light output distributions measured by the EJ309 de-
tector for HEU and DU, respectively. In the HEU data,
a fast neutron recoil region around PSP=0.28 is readily
apparent. However, this feature is entirely absent from
the DU distribution. This stark contrast provides con-
vincing evidence that the presence or absence of high-
energy fission neutrons in the delayed neutrons spectrum
can be used to perform isotopic discrimination.
Coincidence measurements were also used to detect
the presence of delayed neutron-induced fission events.
Coincidence time distributions were recorded for HEU
and DU using two different detector pairings: composite-
EJ309 and composite-NaI(Tl). In each case, the coinci-
dence event rate recorded during the neutron generator
off cycles was compared with the rate observed during
passive measurement for each uranium object. A sum-
mary of the measured coincidence rates for each detector
pairing and scenario is presented in Table II. Example
coincidence distributions are included in the Supplemen-
tary Information.
Because both samples contain 238U, which undergoes
spontaneous fission, the comparison between HEU and
DU is not as simple as noting the presence or absence
of coincident radiation from fission. While the relative
change in the total coincidence rate after interrogation
(when delayed neutrons are present) is much greater for
HEU, suggesting that much of the change is due to de-
layed neutron-induced fission events, this interpretation
must be weighted against a number of complicating fac-
tors.
Based on further simulation and analysis, which is
7(a) HEU
(b) DU
FIG. 7: PSP and light output distributions measured
in EJ309 for (a) HEU and (b) DU.
TABLE II: Measured coincidence rates for HEU and
DU for composite-EJ309 and composite-NaI(Tl)
detector pairings. For each material, the coincidence
rate observed during delayed signal measurements was
compared to the coincidence rate for passive
measurements.
HEU DU
Composite-EJ309
Passive Rate (s−1) 55.87 ± 0.70 50.30 ± 0.34
Active Rate (s−1) 89.17 ± 0.25 58.90 ± 0.16
% Change 60% 17%
Composite-NaI(Tl)
Passive Rate (s−1) 1.70 ± 0.25 2.62 ± 0.14
Active Rate (s−1) 3.78 ± 0.10 2.91 ± 0.07
% Change 122% 11%
presented in detail in the Supplementary Information,
the measured passive coincidence rate for each mate-
rial is too high to be attributed to spontaneous fission
alone. The increased passive coincidence rates may be
partly attributed to a high gamma-ray background at
the DAF, as well as activation caused by the DT gener-
ator. Furthermore, the HEU object can be fissioned by
thermal neutrons, which can cause additional coincidence
events. Combined with natural background, the presence
of neutron-emitting calibration sources, such as AmBe,
in the room during the experiment means that thermal
neutron induced fission may also have been a factor.
With the goal of eliminating events that were not
caused by fission, the coincidence rates were reexam-
ined while only accepting neutron recoil pulses from the
EJ309 detector. Examples of the resulting coincidence
time distributions are included in the Supplementary In-
formation. Table III presents a summary of the exper-
imentally measured coincidence rates when the neutron
recoil criterion is applied. When coincidence events are
required to contain at least one neutron interaction, the
differences between the HEU and DU coincidence rates
become much more pronounced.
TABLE III: Experimental fission tagging rates for HEU
and DU using the composite-EJ309 detector pairing,
with only neutron events accepted for the EJ309
detector.
HEU DU
Passive Rate (s−1) 0.442 ± 0.054 0.035 ± 0.007
Active Rate (s−1) 9.14 ± 0.07 0.079 ± 0.005
% Change 1968% 126%
In the case of DU, the coincidence rate more than dou-
bles, even though delayed neutrons are not expected to
cause an increase in coincidences due to fission. However,
this is most likely due to an increased number of pileup
events in the neutron recoil region for EJ309, as Fig. 7(b)
suggests. While the passive coincidence rate for HEU is
still quite high relative to expectation, it is much lower
than when all events are considered. Given the presence
of other neutron sources in the experimental space, it is
also reasonable to assume that some of the discrepancy
is accounted for by additional fissions caused by thermal
neutrons. Most notably, the overall coincidence rate for
HEU after interrogation is more than 100 times higher
than the rate for DU, and the change in the HEU coinci-
dence rate between the passive and active measurements
is very significant, increasing by more than a factor of 20.
This is consistent with the expectation that delayed neu-
trons will induce additional fission at a much greater rate
in HEU than DU, providing the basis for discrimination.
Furthermore, the time evolution of the rate of coin-
cidence events from fission can provide valuable infor-
mation on the 235U content of the test material. Be-
cause the delayed neutron groups for each uranium iso-
tope constitute a unique set of decay time constants,
the overall delayed neutron time emission profile can be
used to discriminate between isotopes and infer enrich-
ment. Delayed neutron-induced fission events occur on
the same timescale as their delayed neutron precursors,
so coincidence-based measurements of the rate of delayed
fission events should exhibit the same temporal shape
predicted for delayed neutron emission. Fig. 8 shows the
8time distribution of coincidence events for HEU in the
period after the neutron generator has been turned off.
FIG. 8: Time distribution of delayed coincidence events
in HEU, measured using the composite-EJ309 detector
pairing. Only neutron recoil pulses were accepted from
the EJ309 detector. The fit is based on tabular nuclear
data and parameterized with only a scaling factor (C)
and constant background term (B).
The composite-EJ309 detector pairing was used again,
but while accepting only neutron recoil events from the
EJ309 detector. The experimental data are fitted with
a parameterized model based on a six-group superposi-
tion of delayed neutrons, whose decay constants are ob-
tained from tabular nuclear data; the procedure is de-
scribed in depth in Ref. [23]. The experimental results
show close agreement with the model (χ2 = 200.2/198),
which confirms that the coincidence events are caused by
delayed neutron-induced fission and suggests that dis-
crimination based on the delayed neutron time emission
profile can also be performed using fast neutron mea-
surements, provided that the material is fissionable by
lower-energy delayed neutrons. The coincidence-based
approach presented here could supplement the methods
described in Ref. [23], providing an additional point of
distinction between isotopes.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated two measurement
methods for differentiating the components of delayed
neutron signals in bulk samples of SNM based on their
origin. Through fission radiation coincidence counting
and spectroscopic neutron energy measurements, we have
shown a significant refinement in the ability to capture in-
formation on delayed neutron-induced fission as a means
for performing isotopic identification. For fission rate
measurements, we found that high background gamma-
ray rates hindered the usefulness of NaI(Tl) detectors,
and detectors with the ability to discriminate fast neu-
tron recoils were necessary to isolate the fission signa-
ture. For fissionable materials with large differences in
fission cross-section at typical delayed neutron energies,
such as 235U and 238U, we show that these types of mea-
surements are sufficient to successfully perform isotopic
discrimination. Further refinement of the capture-gated
neutron spectroscopy technique to detect small changes
in the delayed neutron energy signature would provide
even greater precision in differentiating materials. The
measurement approaches presented here have the po-
tential to complement existing delayed neutron analysis
techniques, and when employed in concert with methods
that focus on time-dependent signatures, they may lead
to even greater accuracy in SNM characterization.
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Supplementary Note 1: Details on Uranium Test Objects
A set of concentric HEU hemispheres known as the Rocky Flats shells was used as the HEU object.
The Rocky Flats shells have a bulk density of 18.664 g/cm3 and an isotopic content of 93.16% 235U,
5.35% 238U, and less than 2% of other isotopes of uranium [S1]. Shells 01–24 were assembled into
a spherical object with an approximate mass of 13.8 kg. Detailed information on the masses and
dimensions of the individual shells can be found in Ref. [S1]. The depleted uranium object also
consisted of a set of hemispherical shells arranged to form a sphere. The mass of the DU object
was 12.8 kg, which was the closest approximation to the HEU object mass that could be achieved
with the available shell configurations.
Supplementary Note 2: Composite Detector Design and Principle of Operation
The composite detector is a larger version of the prototype described in Ref. [S2], and consists
of an array of 1×1×76 mm3 GS20 lithium glass square rods embedded in a cylindrical matrix of
scintillating polyvinyl toluene (PVT) with a height and diameter of 12.7 cm. The GS20 glass is
6.6% lithium by weight, and is enriched to approximately 95% 6Li. A diagram of the composite
detector design is shown in Fig. S1.
(a) (b)
Figure S1: Geant4 rendering of the composite detector geometry: (a) top and (b) side view
The principal detection mechanism for the composite detector is neutron capture by 6Li, which
has a reaction Q-value of 4.8 MeV and releases a triton and an alpha particle. The short range of
the heavy charged particle products means that they generally deposit most of their energy in the
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lithium-doped glass, which possesses very different scintillation properties from the PVT plastic.
As a result, neutron capture events are easily distinguishable by both a characteristic pulse shape
and the characteristic Q-value of the reaction. The PVT matrix surrounding the lithium glass
rods serves a dual purpose. Not only does it increase the capture efficiency of the detector by
moderating the incident neutrons, but the scintillation response of the PVT to proton recoils in
the neutron thermalization process provides a signal whose magnitude is correlated to the incident
neutron energy [S3]. The recoil pulses from neutron thermalization are also correlated in time with
the subsequent capture pulses. Though there can be significant variation in the time separation
between pulses due to thermal neutron diffusion in the PVT, the average time to capture ranges
from a few μs to about 10 μs, depending on the detector design and size. By exploiting this time
coincidence between a capture pulse and the preceding proton recoil pulse, spectroscopic neutron
energy analysis can be performed [S4].
Supplementary Note 3: Details on Data Acquisition
The detector electronics included Hamamatsu model R6527 and R6231 photomultiplier tubes
(PMT), which were coupled to the composite detector (biased at 1750 V) and one of the EJ309 de-
tectors (biased at 900 V), respectively. The other EJ309 detector was coupled to a 7.6-cm diameter
Bicron PMT (biased at 1200 V), and the NaI(Tl) was a Gamma Spectacular GS-2020 integrated
detector and PMT unit (biased at 750 V). Each detector was powered using a CAEN DT5533
high-voltage power supply, and the output was digitized using a CAEN DT5730 14-bit, 500-MHz
desktop waveform digitizer with digital pulse processing-pulse shape discrimination (DPP-PSD)
firmware. Data acquisition and storage was performed using CAEN Multi-Parameter Spectroscopy
Software (CoMPASS) [S5]. For each waveform, short-gate (Qshort) and long-gate (Qlong) charge
integrals were recorded to provide the basis for pulse shape discrimination. The integration bound-
ary parameters were defined relative to tstart, the start of the waveform determined by the leading
edge trigger time in the digitizer. Qshort was integrated from tstart− toffset to tstart + tshort, and Qlong
was integrated from tstart − toffset to tstart + tlong, where toffset is the offset time prior to the start
of the waveform, and tshort and tlong are the endpoints for the short-gate and long-gate integration
windows, respectively. The integration parameters were optimized for each detector prior to the
experiment, and are presented in Table S1.
Table S1: Waveform integration parameters.
Detector toffset (ns) tshort (ns) tlong (ns)
Composite 24 36 376
EJ309 - 1 24 36 376
EJ309 - 2 50 50 350
NaI(Tl) 24 176 776
Supplementary Note 4: Delayed Neutron Spectrum Simulation Methods
In the simulation conducted using the MCNP-Polimi code [S6], spherical HEU and DU objects of
the approximate size and mass of the experimentally measured assemblies were interrogated with
14.1-MeV neutrons, and the time of generation and initial energy of emitted neutrons were recorded
upon their arrival in a liquid scintillation detector. The prompt and delayed neutron spectra were
separated using a simple time threshold, where neutrons arriving at the detector within 10 μs of
the generation of the source particle were vetoed. The time threshold was chosen based on the
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simulated time distribution of prompt neutrons. A cutoff of 10 μs excludes 99.99% of the prompt
neutrons, while the vast majority of delayed neutrons arrive much later than 10 μs after their parent
fission event. Within the delayed neutron data, primary delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons
from delayed fission were differentiated by tracking their individual histories in the MCNPX-PoliMi
collision file output. Based on the particle and generation numbers of each delayed neutron, the
corresponding parent fission event was located within the fission chain in the uranium object. If
the time delay between the parent fission and detection of the delayed neutron was greater than
10 μs, the event was categorized as a primary delayed neutron. Otherwise, it was considered to
be a prompt neutron from delayed fission. This analysis method allowed for estimation of the
relative contribution of each type of delayed neutron to the overall delayed spectrum emitted by
each object.
Supplementary Note 5: A Method for Isotope Discrimination Based on
Capture-Gated Spectrum Shape
The capture-gated event rates above 400 keVee are 58.95 s−1 for HEU and 18.76 s−1 for DU. HEU
and DU could be distinguished based on rate comparison, but such a method relies on the knowledge
of sample mass. A more robust isotope discrimination method would be based on differences in
the shapes of the neutron energy spectra. One possibility is to use a simple ratio of two different
regions of the energy spectrum, which would provide a characteristic number associated with the
proportion of prompt neutrons from delayed fission in the spectrum (and thus an indicator of
enrichment). Fig. S2 shows a diagram of our proposed metric, which is the ratio of the integral
of the high-energy tail of the neutron spectrum to the integral of the entire spectrum. We refer
to this ratio as R, and to its standard deviation as σ. A figure of merit (FOM) for discrimination
could be determined using the expression
FOM =
RHEU −RDU
σRHEU + σRDU
, (S1)
similarly to a standard method used for evaluating pulse-shape-discrimination performance of scin-
tillators.
Figure S2: Diagram of the proposed integration regions for determining the characteristic spectral
shape ratio. The example spectrum shown is for HEU.
The ratio R is determined by the choice of parameter Lo, which is the light-output threshold
separating the high-energy tail from the rest of the spectrum. The threshold Lo = 515 keVee shown
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in Fig. S2 is the result of optimizing for the maximum separation between the ratios for HEU and
DU along with the minimum statistical error. The maximum ratio separation occurs at 515 keVee,
where the HEU ratio, RHEU, is 0.302 and the DU ratio, RDU, is 0.178. While the minimum
statistical error of 1.1% occurs a higher Lo value of about 700 keVee, the error at 515 keVee is only
very slightly higher at 1.24%. As such, the marginal loss in ratio separation by moving the Lo value
closer to 700 keVee would be greater than the marginal improvement in statistical error.
The shape-based discrimination method appears promising when applied to the experimental
data. Using the Lo value of 515 keVee, the tail-spectrum count rates were 45.8 s
−1 and 12.2 s−1
for HEU and DU respectively, while the total-spectrum count rates were 151.7 s−1 and 68.8 s−1.
These experimental count rates allow for 3-σ discrimination of the HEU and DU characteristic
ratios within 2 seconds of measurement time after the neutron generator has been turned off. Total
measurement time would be just over one minute, as the one minute interrogation time is necessary
to build up the delayed neutron populations.
Supplementary Note 6: Total Recoil Rate Analysis in the Composite Detector
The overall rate of recoil pulses recorded by the composite detector between generator runs for DU
is consistent with the assertion that the events in the DU capture-gated spectrum above 400 keVee
are caused by gamma-ray accidentals in the thermalization window. When the generator is turned
off following interrogation, the observed rate of recoil pulses is ∼2.1×104 s−1. At this rate, the
average time between events is 48 μs, and the probability of observing a random recoil pulse within
the 76 μs time window preceding a capture pulse is 79.5%. In the experimental results, 74.0% of
recorded capture events are accompanied by a preceding pulse within 76 μs.
The observed rate of events within the thermalization window is close to the prediction if all
thermalization candidate pulses were truly from gamma-ray accidentals, but it is still somewhat too
low. This may be explained by the effects of delayed neutron contributions to the recoil PSP region
and pileup pulses in the neutron capture region. Specifically, if the recoil rate contains significant
contributions from delayed neutrons, the rate of events in the thermalization window will be higher
than expected for random gamma-ray accidentals because neutron recoils are much more likely to
be followed by a subsequent capture event. Furthermore, misclassified pileup pulses in the capture
PSP region are less likely to be preceded by a neutron recoil event. This results in a situation
where the random gamma-ray rate, and thus the probability of an event within the thermalization
time window, is slightly overestimated.
To correct for the effects of delayed neutron recoils on the estimation of the gamma-ray acciden-
tal rate, a 400 keVee light output threshold was applied, effectively removing neutron contributions
from the spectrum. The threshold was determined based on the simulated light output response
of the composite detector to delayed neutrons, as shown in Fig. 3. The overall rate of recoil events
above the threshold was 5.6×103 s−1, resulting in an average time between events of 177 μs and
a 34.9% probability of observing a random event within the 76 μs thermalization window. In the
experimental data, 33.9% of capture events were accompanied by a preceding recoil event within
76 μs, which strongly suggests that gamma-ray accidentals contribute significantly to the the rate
of recoil-capture coincidence events in the DU light output spectrum (Fig. 5) above 400 keVee.
Table S2 provides a summary of the recoil rates, probability of gamma-ray accidentals in the ther-
malization window, and comparison to experimental data, both with and without application of
the 400 keVee light output threshold.
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Table S2: Summary of overall recoil rates in the composite detector and probability of gamma-ray
accidentals within the 76 μs thermalization window. Predicted probabilities based on the overall
rate are compared to experimental results.
All Events
Events
>400 keVee
Recoil Rate (s−1) 2.1×104 5.6×103
Average Time
48 177
Between Events (μs)
Probability of Event
79.5 34.9
Within 76 μs (%)
% of Captures with Preceding
74.0 33.9
Event Within 76 μs
Supplementary Note 7: Coincidence Time Distributions
Example coincidence time distributions measured during the delayed neutron window are shown
in Fig. S3 for the composite-EJ309 and composite-NaI(Tl) detector pairings, respectively. The
prominent coincidence peaks provide a clear indication that fission events continue to take place
during the delayed neutron window.
(a) (b)
Figure S3: Coincidence time distributions for HEU measured during the delayed neutron time
window based on (a) composite-EJ309 and (b) composite-NaI(Tl) detector pairings.
Supplementary Note 8: Analysis of Passive Coincidence Rates
The measured passive coincidence rates for each material are too high to be attributed to spon-
taneous fission alone. 238U has a specific activity of 12.44 MBq/kg, and a spontaneous fission
probability of 5.4× 10−7 per decay. Thus, based on the material composition and total mass, the
expected spontaneous fission rate for the DU and HEU objects would be 87 fission/s and 5 fissions/s,
respectively. MCNPX simulations of the experimental configuration show that the probability of a
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fission event producing observable coincident pulses in the composite and EJ309 detectors is 0.3%
for HEU and 0.053% for DU. For coincidence pulses in the composite and NaI(Tl) detectors, the
probabilities are 0.08% and 0.0006% for HEU and DU, respectively. Table S3 shows the expected
spontaneous fission (SF) tagging rates for each object based on the calculated spontaneous fission
rates and simulated tagging probabilities.
Table S3: Simulated spontaneous fission (SF) rates, tagging probability, and expected tagged event
rates for HEU and DU using each detector pairing.
HEU DU
Composite-EJ309
SF Rate (s−1) 5 87
Tagging Probability 0.30% 0.053%
Tagged Event Rate (s−1) 0.015 0.046
Composite-NaI(Tl)
SF Rate (s−1) 5 87
Tagging Probability 0.08% 0.006%
Tagged Event Rate (s−1) 0.004 0.0052
In both the case of HEU and DU, the expected tagging rates are several orders of magnitude
lower than the experimentally observed coincidence rates. Further investigation of the coincidence
pulses showed that they were consistent with true recoil events and not caused by spurious sources
such as electronic noise. The measurement environment at Device Assembly Facility is complex,
with many other objects near the experimental setup being subjected to bombardment by 14.1-
MeV neutrons, so the high coincidence rates may be partially explained by gamma-ray radiation
from neutron activation products. In addition to any fission byproducts within the test objects, the
entire experimental array was placed on a carbon steel table, so coincident gamma rays from 60Co
(produced by neutron irradiation of Fe) may be a contributing factor. While MCNPX simulations
show the likelihood for crosstalk to be low (<2% for the composite-EJ309 pairing, negligible for
composite-NaI(Tl)), a high background gamma-ray flux due to activation following the neutron
generator operation could lead to an appreciable coincidence signal in the composite-EJ309 detector
pairing due to crosstalk.
With respect to thermal neutron background, MCNPX simulations show that thermal neutrons
incident on the HEU object are about 70% as likely to produce coincident pulses as spontaneous
fission events within the object when averaged over all directions, and much more likely to produce
coincident pulses when incident near the EJ309 and composite detectors. As such, even a small
thermal neutron flux could cause an appreciable change to the measured coincidence rate for HEU.
Given that neutron-emitting calibration sources were present in the room during the experiment,
it is possible that thermal neutron induced fission played a part in elevating the measured passive
coincidence rates.
Supplementary Note 9: Coincidence Distributions with Neutron Pulse Shape
Discrimination Cut
Fig. S4 shows the coincidence time distributions for HEU and DU after interrogation with the
neutron generator when only neutron recoil pulses are accepted from the EJ309 detector, with sim-
ulation results overlaid. Notably, the neutron-based coincidence time distribution for HEU is much
broader than the corresponding distribution for DU and distributions where all event types were
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accepted. This is due to differences in the time of flight for different neutron energies, and perhaps
to some extent by the fact that coincident pulses may be produced by radiation from different
generations in the fission chain reaction. The broadening of the HEU coincidence distribution is
also accurately reflected in the MCNPX model, which has a full-width at half maximum (FWHM)
of 15.7 ns, compared to 16.1 ns for the experimental data. The DU distribution also agrees well
with simulation, including the asymmetry of the coincidence peak, which is caused by neutron
events in the EJ309 detector. For this simulation, the best agreement with experimental data is
achieved when only gamma-ray recoils are considered in the composite detector. This provides
further support for the conjecture that low-energy neutrons often do not register a recoil pulse in
the composite detector.
(a) (b)
Figure S4: Coincidence time distributions using the composite-EJ309 detector pairing for (a) HEU
and (b) DU, where only neutron recoil events are accepted in the EJ309 detector. Simulated
distributions are overlaid in red.
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